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Abstract 
This paper contains an empirical analysis demand for “work-group” (or low-end) servers. Servers are at the 
centre of many US and EU anti-trust debates, including the Hewlett-Packard/Compaq merger and investigations 
into the activities of Microsoft. One question in these policy decisions is whether a high share of work servers 
indicates anything about shortrun market power. To investigate price elasticities we use model-level panel data 
on transaction prices, sales and characteristics of practically every server in the world. We contrast estimates 
from the traditional “macro” approaches that aggregate across brands and modern “micro” approaches that use 
brand-level information (including both “distance metric” and logit based approaches). We find that the macro 
approaches lead to overestimates of consumer price sensitivity. Our preferred micro-based estimates of the 
market level elasticity of demand for work group servers are around 0.3 to 0.6 (compared to 1 to 1.3 in the 
macro estimates). Even at the higher range of the estimates, however, we find that demand elasticities are 
sufficiently low to imply a distinct “anti-trust” market for work group servers and their operating systems. It is 
unsurprising that firms with large shares of work group servers have come under some antitrust scrutiny. 
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1.  Introduction 
The motivation of this paper is both practical and methodological. The practical aspect is to 
provide, for the first time, estimates of demand elasticities for network servers. Servers are a 
vital but rarely studied element of the digital economy that have moved to centre stage in 
recent anti-trust debates in the US and Europe. The methodological aspect of the paper is to 
provide systematic comparisons of estimates of demand systems based on the “micro” brand-
level approaches common in applied industrial organization to the more aggregate estimates 
familiar in the macro-literature. We show that there are large aggregation biases of the macro 
approach compared to our preferred micro approaches.  
 
In the late 1980s computing architecture went through a paradigm shift. The mainframe-
orientated system evolved swiftly towards the "PC client/server" computer architecture that is 
familiar today
2. Instead of computer intelligence being centralised and users interacting via 
“dumb” terminals, processing power was more decentralised, distributed between PCs with 
their own operating systems and increasingly powerful servers linking these PCs together in 
networks.  
 
The economics literature on ICT (information and communication technologies) is large, but 
has generally ignored severs
3. This is a surprising omission given that total expenditure on 
servers was about $56bn in 2000
4, and server expenditure has been growing at a faster rate than 
corporate spending on PCs. Furthermore, the market for work group servers (the “low end” 
side of the market) has become a major area of anti-trust debate. First, the merger between 
Hewlett-Packard and Compaq is one of a large number of consolidations of hardware vendors. 
Second, the European Commission has recently concluded that Microsoft used its monopoly in 
PC operating systems to dominate the work group server space through limiting 
“interoperability” between Windows and rival operating systems
5. The remedy in the US 
Microsoft case also focuses on server operating systems as “middleware” which poses a 
potential platform threat to Microsoft’s PC monopoly
6. Figure 1 shows that in the first quarter 
of 2001 58% of low end servers ran a version of the Windows operating system compared to 
only 21% at the start of 1996. Large shares of sales of work group servers would not be a 
concern if there was easy substitutability for other forms of ICT – i.e. if work group servers 
were not a “relevant market” in anti-trust jargon. A practical objective of this paper is, 
therefore, to estimate the magnitude of the market level elasticity of demand to investigate 
whether there is “a market for work group servers”
7. 
                                                 
2 See Bresnahan and Greenstein (1996) for an economic analysis of this transition. 
3 The literature has mainly focused on the impact of ICT on productivity, hedonic prices and welfare (e.g. 
Bresnahan (1989), Brynjolfsson (1996, 1997), Greenstein (1997)). When ICT is disaggregated at all it tends to be 
PCs or mainframes that are the focus. 





6 See Carlton and Waldman (2002) for an analysis of why a monopolist may leverage into a complementary 
market in order to stifle future competition in his primary market. 
7 Showing that there is a relevant market is not sufficient to demonstrate anti-competitive effects, of course. Even 
if a firm does gain a large share it may do so by competitive means. 
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In pursuing this question we estimate at a macro level and a micro (brand/model) level. 
Although applied I.O. has focused on increasingly sophisticated brand level demand estimation 
for differentiated products
8, many authors have kept to the traditional macro-approach of using 
time series data estimated across all brands in a region
9. The macro approach has a major 
advantage in requiring significantly less data and computational complexity than the micro 
approach. Even those who argue for micro approaches sometimes claim that it is better to use 
macro data if the question is focused on the market level elasticity of demand
10. The macro 
approach has serious downsides, however. Not only is it inefficient as the cross sectional 
information on brand prices and quantities is ignored, but it is likely to lead to inconsistent 
estimates of demand elasticities due to aggregation biases.  
 
The basic macro approach (and its attendant problems) can be illustrated in Figure 2
11 which 
plots quality adjusted prices against quality adjusted quantities. It is tempting to interpret the 
slope of the line as an estimate of the demand elasticity: exogenous technical change shifts an 
upward sloping supply curve to the right, tracing out the stable demand curve. Apart from the 
issue of demand shocks (which also affect the micro estimates) there is a problem that the 
quality adjusted price deflator will appear on the right hand side of the demand equation and in 
the denominator of quality adjusted quantity on the left hand side of the equation. This will 
lead to a negative bias – i.e. if the true demand elasticity is inelastic there will be a bias towards 
finding that customers are more price sensitive than they actually are. This may be one reason 
why many of the existing “macro” estimates are close to negative unity
12 (we also find 
estimates of around unity in the macro-approach).  
 
To investigate these issues we estimate demand systems for servers using a model-level 
quarterly panel that contains information on (essentially) all servers between 1996 and 2001. 
We focus on the US where our data is richest, but also present results for Western Europe and 
Japan.  
 
Our main empirical finding is that the estimated demand elasticities for work group server 
systems (i.e. the hardware/software bundle) are sufficiently inelastic to suggest a separate 
product market. Methodologically, we also find significant upwards bias from the macro 
estimates (suggesting absolute values of demand elasticities of the work group server market of 
around 1 to 1.3) compared to micro-estimates (suggesting elasticities of around 0.25 to 0.55). 
The situation on the software side is more complex since the demand for operating systems is a 
derived demand. Since the operating system is only a minor fraction of the total price, 
                                                 
8 See inter alia Berry et al (1995), Nevo (200), Pinske et al (2002). Unfortunately our “micro” approach does not 
have consumer level data like Petrin (2002) or Berry et al (2004). 
9 For example, Chow (1967), Brynjolfsson (1996, 1997), Gordon (2002), Reddy et al (2001).  Schmalensee (2000) 
and others have relied on these estimates. 
10 For example, Werden and Froeb (1994, p.4) 
11 This figure uses estimates from our implementation of the macro approach described in sub-section 3.1 below. 
12 Chow (1967) uses US data between 1955 and 1965 and regresses the log of the quality adjusted quantity of 
computers against the log hedonic price, log GDP and a constant. He finds an elasticity of 1.04 (1.44 when 
dropping GDP). Brynjolfsson (1996) presents a series of estimates for "office, computing and accounting 
machinery" (OCAM) for more recent US data between 1970 and 1989. His central estimates are also around 
unity (for the whole economy) but range between 0.6 and 1.4. Gordon (2002) finds that the elasticity has fallen in 
absolute value from 1.96 in 1972-87, to 1.19 in 1987-1995 to 1.15 between 1995 and 1999 (these do not condition 
on GDP, though). Brynjolfsson (1997) analyses aggregate mainframe sales between 1968 and 1981 and finds an 
elasticity of demand of 1.05. 
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however, we argue that the derived demand elasticity for the operating system will tend to be 
even more inelastic than the demand elasticity for the hardware/software bundle. This implies, 
subject to many caveats, that the operating systems for work group servers are also an anti-trust 
market. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a basic introduction to the role of servers in 
modern computing and discusses the substitution possibilities between low-end and high-end 
servers. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework we use and section 4 discusses 
econometric issues. Section 5 details the data and section 6 contains the results. We draw out 
the implications of the results for the elasticity of demand for work group servers and their 
operating systems (OS) in section 7 and offer some concluding comments in section 8. 
 
 
2.  Network servers in modern computing 
2.1 Client-server networks 
Computing can be performed locally on stand-alone appliances such as using a laptop 
computer away from the office.  Most computing, however, is performed on multi-user 
networks in which users communicate through ‘clients’ and in which much of the computing 
activity takes place behind the scenes on ‘servers’
13.  The clients in a client-server network take 
many forms.  Some are ‘intelligent,’ such as a desktop computer; others are ‘non-intelligent,’ 
such as a dumb terminal (e.g. an ATM machine).  Servers vary in size and in the nature of the 
tasks they are asked to perform.  The mixture of servers in a client-server network depends on 
the kinds of computing that the network is designed to support.  The server requirements of a 
small office, for example, are considerably different than the server requirements of a large 
international bank.   
 
Like all computers, servers consist of both hardware (e.g. the processors and storage 
facilities/memory) and software (e.g. the operating system).  Server hardware is manufactured 
using various types of processors.  Intel processors are used in many servers, and Microsoft’s 
Windows operating system is compatible only with hardware that uses Intel processors.   
Novell’s NetWare and SCO’s UNIX variants are also designed to run on Intel processors.  The 
leading hardware manufacturers for Intel-based servers include Compaq/HP, Dell, and IBM. 
Server vendors typically sell Intel-based systems on a non-integrated basis. An organisation 
usually buys server hardware from one vendor with the server operating system installed from 
another vendor (or, the organization will install the server operating system itself).  Server 
systems are also sold on an integrated basis in which the vendor supplies both the server 
hardware and a proprietary operating system that has been specially designed for the vendor’s 
hardware.  Sun, HP and IBM are the leading suppliers of these integrated server systems.
14  
Each of these firms uses its own flavour of UNIX as the operating system for its server system.  
                                                 
13 For a basic discussion of servers see, for example, Sybex (2001) 
14 Sun combines its Solaris operating system with its SPARC processors, HP combines its HP-UX operating 
system with its PA-RISC processors (although these are to be shifted to IA-64), IBM combines its AIX operating 
system with its Power and Power PC processors, SGI offers the IRIX operating system combined with its MIPS 
chips. COMPAQ has Tru4UNIX and Digital UNIX combined with its Alpha chips. IBM and COMPAQ also offer 
non-UNIX operating systems for servers. For IBM the operating systems are OS390 (originally for mini-
computers) and OS400 (originally for main frames) that run on the S390 and AS400 chips respectively. 
COMPAQ has OpenVMS. 
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Linux is another alternative as a server operating system.  Linux is open source software that 
was developed by volunteers interacting largely over the Internet.  It is “shareware” and is 
available for free.  Linux can run on all types of hardware and remains available on the Internet 
for no charge.   
 
2.2 Work group servers versus enterprise servers 
One of the principal benefits of a computer network is that it allows an organisation to share 
computer resources among multiple users.  Clients connected to a network can share printers 
and files.  Application programmes can be maintained on central servers and then ‘served’ to 
clients on an as-needed basis.  Work group servers are used to perform a number of the basic 
“infrastructure” services needed for the computers in a network to share resources.  Work 
group servers most commonly handle security (authorisation and authentication of users when 
they connect their clients to the network), file services (accessing or managing files or disk 
storage space), print services, directory services (keeping track of the location and use of 
network resources), messaging and e-mail, and key administrative functions in the 
management of the work group network. 
 
In addition to these infrastructure services, work group servers also execute certain kinds of 
server-side applications.  The application programmes that run on work group servers tend to 
be standardised applications that are used uniformly across business environments.
15  Work 
group servers are also used to execute portions of distributed applications.
16 
 
The ability to share resources such as printers, files and application programmes is one benefit 
of a computer network. In many organisations, there is a pressing need to manage enormous 
amounts of data - inventory control, airline reservations and banking transactions are just a few 
examples.  The ‘mission-critical’ data used for these purposes need to be stored, updated, 
quality controlled, and protected.  They also need to be readily available to authorised users. 
The servers that perform these mission-critical data functions are frequently referred to as 
enterprise servers.  Enterprise servers tend to be larger and significantly more expensive than 
work group servers.  In our sample period a work group server usually has one (or sometimes 
two) microprocessors and modest memory (around four gigabytes).  A work group server can 
provide services for up to about 100 clients, although 25-35 clients would be more common.  
Enterprise servers, in contrast, tend to have at least eight processors, usually cost more than 
$100,000 and in some circumstances can cost more than $1 million. 
 
The uses to which mission-critical data are put, and the methods by which they are stored, 
accessed and used, vary widely across organisations.  Thus, in contrast to the standardised 
applications that run on work group servers, application programmes for enterprise servers tend 
to be custom written and specific to a particular organisation.  Reliability and security are 
especially important for these servers.  Large costs are incurred if vital data are corrupted or 
                                                 
15 Exchange and SQL Server are examples of standardised applications that run on work group servers.  Exchange 
is a server application programme that works with Outlook on the client side to provide communication services 
such as group e-mail, scheduling and address books.  SQL Server is a server application that allows users to 
interrogate and work with databases stored on servers. For more information on these Microsoft server 
applications, see http://www.microsoft.com/servers. 
16 A distributed application is one that relies on objects stored across a number of computers - both clients and 
servers. Work group servers are also used for local administration; remote access services (accessing the server 
from a remote location through a communications link); terminal services (enabling client devices to use 
applications or data residing on the server); and, in some cases, for hosting web sites. 
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‘go down’ for even a short period.  The consequences may be even worse if unauthorised users 
are able to access an organisation’s confidential data.  This need for reliability and security 
means that enterprise servers require robust operating systems that are not susceptible to 
crashes and that have highly developed security features.   
 
 
2.3 N-tier architectures 
Because there are fundamental differences between the functions performed by work group 
servers and enterprise servers, modern computer networks typically have multiple tiers, in 
which each tier performs a distinct set of functions.  The number of tiers in a computer network 
can vary, depending on the size and complexity of the organisation.  For this reason, multiple 
tier architectures are frequently described as N-tier structures.  Generally, however, N-tier 
network architectures have at least three distinct layers: 
 
1.  First tier – the presentation tier.  This is the user environment with the associated menu, 
display, screen, dialogue boxes, etc.  The presentation tier will typically sit upon a 
desktop or other form of client computer; 
2.  Second (or ‘middle’) tier – the business logic tier.  This tier has the resources needed to 
operate basic business processes.   
3.     Third tier – the data tier.  This is where all the data are physically stored and managed.  
This tier may itself be divided into a number of sub-tiers.  The systems and software that 
comprise this tier have to ensure predictable, reliable and secure access to data inquiries.  
These will sit on larger enterprise-level servers. 
 
Even though this description may suggest that substitution possibilities between work group 
and enterprise servers are limited, a network architect has to make decisions at the margin 
regarding whether to allocate certain network functions to a work group server or to an 
enterprise server.  If this is a large enough margin for discretion then there may be substantial 
substitution possibilities.  
 
The limits on the ability of a network architect to add functions typically performed by a work 
group server to an enterprise server relate to cost efficiency, isolation and flexibility. First, it is 
more cost efficient to locate many functions on work group servers because these functions do 
not require so much computing power and one can make do with cheaper hardware and 
operating systems.  Training costs are also particularly important
17.  Second, isolating the data 
layer protects the data stored in the enterprise level from crashes that could be caused by access 
from more mundane tasks.  Where there is a need for high reliability and security, it is 
undesirable to mix data management at the enterprise function level with the more trivial tasks 
of writing letters or opening a web page. Third, to perform all server functions on one layer 
reduces organizational flexibility.  Work group servers can be adapted to the needs of particular 
sub-groups in the organisation, enabling greater decentralisation
18.  Work group servers allow 
                                                 
17 The specialised skills and training needed to manage the data layer machines are not needed to manage work 
group machines.  It costs much less for an engineer to fix a bug in a work group server than in an enterprise 
server. 
18 For the importance of organisational decentralisation and the efficient exploitation of ICT see Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002). 
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local administrators to make changes within local business units that are not necessary or 
desirable across the entire business
19.   
 
Against these considerations is the fact that customers can cluster
20 work group servers 
together into server “farms” that can mimic some of the functionalities of enterprise servers. 
Although some industry observers regard clustering as less secure and reliable than a single 
enterprise server, the ability to cluster opens up more substitution possibilities.  
 
Ultimately, the sensitivity of customer demand to changes in price must be an empirical issue. 
We now turn to ways in which this can be econometrically modelled.   
 
 
3.  Modelling Framework 
We follow the standard approach of considering the demand for operating systems as a derived 
demand
21. This overwhelming majority of sales of server operating systems take place when 
the hardware for the server is sold. Since every server requires an operating system (OS) to use 
applications and provide infrastructure services, it seems natural to first consider the demand 
for the server system (i.e. the hardware/software bundle).  
 
There are several possible methods of modelling the demand side of the server market. We 
contrast two basic approaches: a “macro” strategy and a “micro” strategy. This is somewhat of 
a misnomer as the macro approach will also use micro data (to construct the hedonic price 
index), but the distinction is that the crucial econometric estimates of demand in the macro 
approach will be on the data aggregated across all brands. Within the macro approach we 
distinguish between logit based models and the distance metric approach. 
 
The approaches are not nested within each other as they rely on different assumptions. Still, we 
believe a comparison between the methods is instructive as typically authors plumb for one 
approach or another and argue for superiority on a prior or practical grounds rather than 
considering a variety of methods. 
 
3.1 Macro Approach: Multi-level modelling 
In the first approach to examining the demand for computers we follow the common method of 
estimating a multi-level demand system based on two-stage budgeting approach (see Gorman, 
1971). Versions of this approach have been the most common way to estimate at aggregate 
demand elasticities for computers
22. The customer is assumed to follow the decision process 
sketched in Figure 3. The “top” level decision is how much expenditure to allocate on servers 
rather than other items (such as other ICT expenditures). The “middle” level decision is how 
much of the server expenditure to allocate to work group servers rather than enterprise servers. 
The “bottom” level is what brands of servers to buy, conditional on a budget for a particular 
                                                 
19 For example, work group servers allow a network administrator to tailor report or letter templates to the 
particular needs of different departments to reflect different addresses, customers and conditions of business.   
20 This is also known as “horizontal scaling” by software engineers. 
21 For example, Schmalensee (2000) or Foncel and Ivaldi (2001). 
22 For example, Chow, 1967, Brynjolfsson, 1996, 1997, Gordon, 2002.   
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group of servers. This seems a natural ordering to use to test the null hypothesis that work 
group servers and enterprise servers are close substitutes
23.   
 
Referring to Figure 3, at the top level we follow Stone (1954) and use a simple log-log form: 
(1) 
nt nt n nt n n nt e GDP D + Π + + = ln ) ln( ln 1 ρ λ λ  
 
where subscript t denotes time period (1996Q1 to 2001Q1) and n is for a regional market 
(USA, Western Europe or Japan).  The variables are: D  = total  (quality adjusted) units sold of 
servers, GDP = real GDP, ent is an error term (whose properties we discuss below) and Π is a 
price index for the entire server market.  This price index can be approximated (in region n) by 
a Stone index of the form Πnt  = Σm (Snmtlnπnmt) where Snm is the expenditure share of group m 
in total server expenditure and πnm is a quality adjusted price index for group m (= 1,…, M).  
In the baseline case M = 2, i.e. W (workgroup/low-end servers) and H (high-end/enterprise 
servers). 
 
Turning to the middle-level system we use the L-AIDS (Linearized Almost Ideal Demand 
System) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).  The specific form is (see Appendix C): 
 
(2) 
() () Wt Ht Wt WW t W W Wt u Y S + + Π + = π π δ β β ln ln 0  
 
Where Y = total expenditure on servers in mth segment of the nth country, π = (quality 
adjusted) price of servers in segment m, and u is a random error term. We also contrast this 
with the log-log form (this will be a two equation system with cross equation restrictions for 
Slutsky symmetry and homogeneity).  
(3) 




mt e Y D + + Π + = π ρ λ λ ln ) / ln( ln  
 
In principle, the lowest level consists of brand share equations could take the form (again, 
within a market, n): 
 
(4) 
()∑ = + + + =
I
i imt imt im mt im m i imt v Y W
1 0 ln ln π α π γ γ  
 
Where W is the share of model i ( i =1,…,I) in total segment expenditure. πimt is the model’s 
price and vimt is an error term. We do not estimate equation (4) directly in the main results.  
Although interesting in their own right, the parameters are only necessary in this “macro” 
analysis to help construct the exact price indices πnmt used in the middle-level equations.  
Furthermore, full estimation of equation (4) would be impossible due to the large number of 
parameters on the cross price terms (we have about 1,000 models in the US alone). Thus, we 
focus on the problem of getting quality-adjusted estimates of πnmt and of estimating the middle 
                                                 
23 There are, of course, other segmentations that one might consider, such as more than two segments at the 
middle level (e.g. mid-range servers). Also one could imagine further segmenting the bottom level – for example 
into Windows vs. non-Windows systems (we test whether adding this level to the demand system makes any 
difference to the results on the overall elasticity in section 6).  
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and top equations. In the next sub-section we investigate a version of equation (4) where we 
place greater structure on our assumptions over consumer utility.  
 
 
3.2 Micro approaches: brand level estimation of demand 
A major problem in a differentiated product context is how to identify the brand level price 
effects. This can be clearly seen in the context of our multi-level model where it is clear from 
equation (4) that there are an infeasible number of cross price effects to consider. We would 
have to create a large number of possibly arbitrary other levels in the multi-level model in 
order to make the problem tractable.  
 
An alternative approach is to place further structure on the consumers’ decision-making 
process. There are several possible approaches and we distinguish between three: nested logit, 
distance metric and random coefficients. 
 
Consider first the nested logit approach of McFadden (1981) as adopted by Foncel and Ivaldi 
(2001)
24. The formal structure is the similar to that of Figure 3
25, but we place more structure 
on the patterns of demand. In particular we assume utility takes the form of “random” utilities 
underlying the logit oligopoly model. The technical details are in Appendix C, but essentially 




im m im m im m i m i s P X a s ξ σ α θ + + − + = ) ) | ( ln( ' ) ln(  
 
Where qim  = server units, si = qim/L is the volume share of servers in the potential market (L), 
s(i|m) = qim/Qm is the share of server units in segment m,  X is a vector of server quality-related 
characteristics, P is server price, and ξim is an error term. If work group servers are not a 
distinct segment then σ = 0. To be consistent with economic theory the regression must also 
satisfy the restrictions that σ < 1 and α > 0. Market level elasticities can also be recovered from 
simulating a 1% increase in the price of all brands. 
 
The advantage of this approach is that it is very parsimonious - only a within segment share 
term (in addition to price and product characteristics) appears on the right hand side of 
equation (5) rather than all the other brand price terms in equation (4).  
 
There at least three problems. First, in addition to finding instruments for own price we also 
have to find instruments for the within segment share. Secondly, the size of the brand and 
market elasticities depends on the size of the potential market that we will capture by a scaling 
factor (so that L is proportional to the total number of servers sold by a factor, τ, see Ivaldi and 
Verboven, 2001). It is important to experiment with different levels of this scaling factor 
                                                 
24 Apart from being on a separate part of the computer market (servers rather than PCs) to Foncel and Ivaldi’s, our 
paper differs from theirs in several other respects. First, we focus on businesses rather than households. Second, 
we explicitly compare alternatives to the nested logit (macro and distance metric). Third, we consider a wider 
variety of identification strategies. Fourth, we do not impose a particular model of supply-side behaviour on our 
data.  Although we have a richer set of quality characteristics, we do not have as much cross country variation as 
they do. 
25 Except there are three choices at the upper level: work group servers, enterprise servers or no servers. 
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relating the actual to potential market, in order to check the robustness of the results. Finally, as 
is well known the tight structure can often lead to implausible elasticities, especially on the 
cross price terms.  
 
Pinkse et al (2002) suggests an alternative “distance metric” approach where all other prices 
enter the brand equations (as with the multi-level model) but these are weighted by a distance 
function that depends inter alia on the product characteristics
26. In particular, demand for server 




j ij i im u Q P b a q + + + = ∑ ς  
 
where  B = [bij] is a I x I symmetric, negative semi-definite matrix. Model prices (p) are 
normalised on the outside good. Following Slade (2004) and Pinske et al (2002) we 
parameterise ai and bii as functions of the brand characteristics, i.e. ai = a(Xi) and bii = b(Xim). 
The off-diagonal elements of B are assumed to be functions of vectors of measures of distance 
between brands in some set of metrics bij = g(dij) where dij is the “distance” between brands i 
and j  (e.g. in memory). We experimented with many different X’s and functional forms of the 




A third micro approach is to allow the coefficients on price and other characteristics to be 
random (Berry et al, 1995). This allows a much more plausible range of cross price elasticities 
than the nested logit at the price of significantly higher levels of computational complexity. We 
are pursuing this approach in current research (Davis et al, in process). 
 
3.3 Hedonic regressions 
To calculate quality-adjusted prices for the macro approach, we first estimate hedonic price 
equations using every model in every quarter in every region. We then calculate a hedonic 
price index for work group and enterprise level servers used in the middle level demand 
equation for each region. We also use the weighted average enterprise and work group server 
hedonic price indices to calculate a price index for the overall server market to use in the top 
level equation. 
 




inmt t nmt nmt inmt inmt v d a X P + + ′ = γ ln  
 
                                                 
26 This form of this model can be rationalised by assuming customers have normalised quadratic utility functions 
(flexible in price). With our assumptions over the functional form of the distance metric this generates equation 
(7). 
27 Empirically we found (like Slade, 2004) that a simple inverse function of absolute distance worked well. In 










j i X X
, | | 1
1
. But we also show robustness to 
including other forms of rival price (such as average work group server price and enterprise server price). 
28 We considered and tested many other functional forms, including higher order polynomials in the 
characteristics. 
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An observation i is vendor, family, model and operating system specific in quarter t.  So in 
equation (7) Pinmt = the price of model i of server type m in region n at time t. d= a set of time 
dummies, X = a vector of characteristics (such as the model’s main memory and clock speed).  
 
We estimate equation (7) separately for each market segment (i.e. workgroup servers and 
enterprise servers) in each region.  We restrict the coefficients to be the same between any two 
adjacent quarters, but allow them to be different for any quarters more than two quarters apart.  
In other words we estimate a regression for 1996Q1-Q2 pooled, for 1996Q2 –Q3 pooled, etc. 
This specification is statistically preferred to imposing common slopes on the characteristic 
vector over all time periods. 
 
The theoretical basis of equation (7) is controversial and should only be seen as a rough first 
order approximation to the “correct” price index
29. The discussion in sub-section 3.2 sketched a  
more structural approach to the price equation based on an explicit utility foundation that 
illustrates some of the problems with interpreting equation (7), such as the problem of 
identifying changes in characteristics from changes in the mark-up. Nevertheless, following the 
standard method for constructing such an index seems like a good starting point to examine the 
evolution of prices in this market.
 
  3.4 Derived Demand for Work Group server operating systems 
The bulk of this paper will be concerned with estimating a plausible range of values for the 
unconditional elasticity of demand for work group servers systems (i.e. the hardware/OS 
bundle). Call this elasticity E’WW. This denotes the proportionate impact on quantity of work 
group servers sold from a proportionate increase in the price of work group servers.  But we are 
also interested in the elasticity of demand for the operating systems on work group servers, EOS.  
 
Under certain assumptions one can define and decompose the elasticity of demand for work 

























where QOS is the quantity sold of operating systems for work group servers, POS  is the price of 
operating systems for work group servers, PW  is the price of the server hardware/software 
bundle. There are two key assumptions underlying the derived demand formula. First, we are 
assuming fixed coefficients - which every server has to have a single operating system - so a 
unit increase the demand for servers will lead to a unit increase the demand for server operating 
systems. This is uncontroversial. Second, we are assuming that the substitution between the 
work group server OS and other inputs is zero. If there were other substitute inputs then an 
additional term would have to be added to equation (8) to reflect the elasticity of substitution 
between the work group OS and this other input. One possible substitute input would be the 
operating systems of enterprise level servers. There are good reasons for believing that these 
alternative OSes are very poor substitutes. This is because the enterprise-level OS do not have 
to inter-operate closely with PC OS - they mainly interact with other servers (see the discussion 
of N-tiering above). The pre-dominantly UNIX based operating systems at the enterprise level 
                                                 
29 See Ekeland, Heckman and Neisham (2004) or Pakes (2003). Van Reenen (2004) compares many different 
methods of calculating hedonic price indices. These can be different for the absolute degree of price falls, but 
make less of a difference for the relative change in prices between work group and enterprise servers. 
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are would find it very difficult to be substitutable for the predominantly Windows-based 
operating systems at the work group level. We discuss these issues in more detail in section 7. 
 
Direct estimation of the elasticities between operating systems is practically impossible 
because of the difficulties in obtaining exact information on the "price" of operating systems
30. 
Nevertheless it is possible to get some idea of the average cost of the operating system in total 
work group server cost (POS/PW). International Data Corporation (IDC) estimate that in 
aggregate operating systems constitute about 10 to 15% of the overall price of a server. Thus 
the relevant elasticity for the market we are considering is 10-15% of the estimated server 
elasticity (see section 7 below). This is an example of the “importance of being unimportant” 
(Henderson, 1922, p.25) – the derived demand elasticity is much lower than the overall 





4. Econometric Issues 
 
Consider the estimation of a stochastic form of equation (5).  
(9) 
it i im it it X P a y υ η θ α + + + − = ' 0  
 
Assuming that the X variables are exogenous the critical question is how to obtain consistent 
estimates of α
32. OLS will generally be biased for a number of reasons. Demand shocks will 
tend to raise price and quantity simultaneously leading to an underestimate of the absolute 
magnitude of the demand elasticity. The demand shocks could be due to permanent omitted 
product characteristics (ηi) or transitory shocks to economic expectations (the part of the υit that 
is correlated with Pit). 
 
4.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity and brand specific effects 
If the bias is solely due to omitted characteristics then this could be dealt with by transforming 
the data to remove the brand specific effects. The results section will consider fixed effect 
approaches, but note that they have well known disadvantages. First, it will be hard to identify 
the impact of model characteristics as these vary little over time: they are highly persistent 
regressors. Secondly, the inclusion of fixed effects will tend to accentuate attenuation bias 
associated with classical measurement error. Thirdly, including a full set of dummy variables 
(i.e. performing “within groups”) will still result in inconsistent estimates in finite samples 
unless the regressors are strictly exogenous (which price is not). Consequently we will also 
consider GMM estimators based around differencing the data that can deal with weakly 
exogenous and endogenous regressors. 
 
                                                 
30 This is because (a) the OS is bundled with the hardware, (b) the pricing of licenses is highly complex and 
unavailable from IDC on a model by model average. 
31 There are at least two other factors that could affect the derived demand formula that we have not modelled. 
First, we have ignored the impact of the purchase of an OS on the demand for future upgrades. But upgrades only 
accounted for 7% of all server OS shipped in 1999 (IDC, 2000a), so they are not likely to be very important. 
Similarly we have not included any effect of a price rise of a server OS in reducing the demand for 
complementary applications software (there is no data on these).  
32 In the nested logit we also have the issue of the segment variable that is a function of quantity. In the macro 
equation we have the problem that the dependent variable is a generated regressor. 
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4.2 Identification and Instrumental variables 
Candidate instruments sets are available from both economic and econometric assumptions. 
From the economic structure of the problem, cost factors that shift the supply curve will be 
important. Since input prices will increase marginal production costs we use several hedonic 
price series from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for hardware components that go 
into the production of server systems. Unfortunately such input cost series are only available in 
the U.S., so these have time series (but not across country or brand) variation. Secondly, under 
the assumptions of the logit demand model, characteristics of other brands do not enter the 
utility function or the final demand relationship in equation (5). The critical assumption is 
mean independence  ) 0 ) | ( = im im X E ξ . Rival characteristics do affect the price equation 
through impacting on the mark-up, however (see Appendix C). Under these theoretical 
assumptions characteristics of other servers can therefore be used as instruments (Berry et al, 
1995, Bresnahan et al, 1997). Such instruments include the number of products in a segment, 
rival brands’ memory and characteristics of the other brands produced by the vendor (through 
the multi-product pricing effect). Note that this assumption relies on the exogeneity of brand 
characteristics.  
 
Econometric assumptions over the pattern of the residuals in space and time are frequently 
used to generate candidate instruments. In the spatial dimension, Hausman et al (1994) and 
Hausman (1997) recommend using prices in other areas as instruments. Their rationale is that 
(conditional on the observables) the brand prices in other regions reflect brand specific cost 
shocks that shift the brand supply curve. Essentially, we can use EU and Japanese prices to 
instrument US prices. This method is valid to the extent that demand shocks are region-
specific and are not common across the developed world.
33  
 
In the temporal dimension, Blundell and Bond (2000) suggest GMM techniques for panel data 
exploiting two sets of moment conditions. First, so long as there is no serial correlation in the 
υit process in equation (9) we can exploit moment conditions of the form E(pit-s∆υit) = 0 where 
s>1. This implies that suitable lags of the level of price are valid instruments for the first 
difference of prices in equation (9). Secondly, if the first moments of y and P are time invariant 
(stationarity is sufficient but not necessary to ensure this) then further moments are available of 
the form E(∆Pit-lυit) = 0,l>0.  This means that lagged differences of prices can be used as 
instruments for the level of prices in equation (9)
 34. We can stack these moment conditions and 
estimate using GMM.  
 
In our empirical application we are careful to examine how different sets of candidate 
instruments (and assumptions concerning unobserved heterogeneity) impact upon the results. 
Our preference is for the “economically” based instruments as their justification is clearer in 
the light of economic theory. Nevertheless, the alternative instruments of prices in other 
                                                 
33 It seems more plausible to use this cross-country variation than within-country variation where national 
marketing campaigns are more common. Bresnahan’s (1997) main critique of Hausman’s (1997) approach was 
that “prices in other cities” would be invalid instrumental variables in the presence of correlated demand shocks 
across cities, such as national advertising campaigns.  
34 These additional instruments are likely to be particularly useful when the endogenous variables are highly 
persistent and there is a danger of “weak instruments”. For estimation we use the DPD package written in GAUSS 
available at www.ifs.org.uk 
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regions and lagged prices could in principle improve efficiency substantially, even if the theory 
is correctly specified.   
 
Formally, we test the validity of the different instrumental variables by considering the Sargan-
Hansen test of the over-identification restrictions. Empirically, we find evidence of problems 
with using “other country” prices as instruments in the micro equations. We also consider the 
reduced forms, in particular the explanatory power of the excluded instruments in the second 
stage in the reduced forms. This is particularly important in the light of the finite sample biases 
that are possible when the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous variables 
(e.g. Staiger and Stock, 1997).   
 
4.3 Endogenous Stratification 
As a practical issue we follow industry observers (and the European Commission) in defining 
the work group server segment in relation to price. IDC defined work group servers as those 
priced below $100,000. Price serves as a proxy for the type of work group functions that 
servers perform, as such precise information is generally not available for the models sold.  
This raises the issue of endogenous sample stratification (e.g. Hausman and Wise, 1984) and 
the attendant biases with truncating a sample based on an endogenous variable. To mitigate 
these issues we select the samples based on an initial condition: whether the server cost more 
of less than $100,000 when it first entered the market
35.  Even selecting on initial conditions 
can cause bias if there is correlation between the current shock and the initial condition. We 
check our main estimating strategy by using truncated regression and selection correction 
techniques to investigate whether this makes any difference to the results. 
 
4.4 Investment Issues and dynamics 
The approach we have followed is familiar in the consumer demand literature, but it is firms, 
not individuals who purchase servers. Would it not be more appropriate to model server 
investment explicitly as an investment decision? 
 
The answer to this is, “yes, in principle”. The investment literature is currently in some disarray 
now because the foundations for the standard quadratic adjustment cost model have been called 
into serious question
36. Although there is little consensus over the appropriate form of the 
investment equation, costs of adjustment will certainly imply some longer dynamics in our 
model. Therefore, we test for the sensitivity of our finding to alternative dynamic forms by 
including lags of the endogenous and exogenous variables.   
 
4.5 Market Power and the “cellophane fallacy” 
We need to be concerned about the so-called “cellophane” fallacy (named after a US antitrust 
case involving DuPont).  In general, the higher the estimated elasticity, the less inclined we are 
to treat the product in question as a relevant market.  High elasticities, in general, suggest the 
availability of good substitutes.  But, high elasticities can also be the result of an exercise of 
market power.  In general, a monopolist will not operate in the inelastic portion of the demand 
                                                 
35 We also experimented with other ways of defining the market (such as using the number of processors) and 
alternative price thresholds (such as $25,000 or $50,000). Our results are robust to these alternatives. 
36 See Bond and Van Reenen (2003) for a survey 
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curve so a high elasticity at the current price is not necessarily evidence of a broader market.  
Prices and market level elasticities may be high precisely because some firm has succeeded in 
monopolising a relevant market. It is important to remember that this will bias our estimates 
towards finding elasticities that are too large and make it harder for us to find evidence that 
work group servers constitute a relevant market. 
 
 
                                                
 
5. Data 
A full set of descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix B. We have used data from the 
International Data Corporation's (IDC) Quarterly tracker database
37. This enables us to analyse 
the evolution of price, revenue and unit sold of every server since the first quarter of 1996 
through the first quarter of 2001 in three major regions (USA, Western Europe, Japan)
 38. In 
principle IDC covers the population of models. It gathers revenue and characteristics data from 
vendors in all the main regions and then cross checks the company totals with global HQs and 
its own customer surveys. Transaction prices (called “street prices” by IDC) are also estimated 
on a region-specific, quarterly, model-by-model basis based on discussions with industry 
participants. These prices take into account the various discounts offered off the list price as 
well as trade-ins. 
 
Looking in a cross section we define an observation in a region as a vendor-family-model-
operating system. A model (we use model and brand interchangeably) is distinguished within a 
family (with some grouping). So a typical example would be Sun Microsystem’s (vendor) 
Ultra-Enterprise (family) 1000HE series (model) running UNIX (OS).  
 
A full set of descriptive statistics is available in Appendix B. At its most disaggregate we have 
14,359 observations in the USA with between 500 and 750 models per quarter. There are 33 
separately identified vendors most of whom will have only two or three families (IBM has the 
most models and seventeen individual “families”).  
 
One obvious concern is that the IDC data only has basic model characteristics. To address this 
we invested substantial time in collecting extra data on server characteristics ourselves and 
matched them into the IDC data (see Appendix B). We used the IDC Quarterly Tracker as our 
“population” and matched in new server characteristics by name and by time period.  We used 
a wide variety of sources to obtain these data including the trade publication Datasources, 
company web pages, back issues of computer magazines and their web pages and major 
resellers. We collected a wide variety of characteristics, the most informative of which were 
memory, internal storage and clock/processor speed
39. The final dataset covered 60% of the 
IDC models and over 80% of the revenues of all servers
40. For the micro demand estimations 
 
37 7
th June 2001 version. For a full description of this database and the recent evolution of the market see IDC 
(1998,2000b) 
38 We have done some analysis on the world market as a whole. The other regional data in IDC (“Rest of Asia” 
and “Rest of World”) appeared less reliable due to smaller sample size. 
39 Other characteristics included cache size on chip, cache size on board, list price, disk capacity in cabinet, 
maximum external storage, maximum I/O channels per processor, maximum I/O bandwidth. These had less 
explanatory power in the hedonic regressions than the three variables we focused on.  
40 Because of this partial coverage we also test the robustness of the results using only the IDC characteristics. 
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we focused on the US market were we have most observations in order to avoid pooling across 
countries.  
 
These characteristics we have include memory (RAM), total clock speed (i.e. MHZ per 
processor multiplied by the number of Central Processing Units), whether the system is rack-
optimised
41, the number of rack slots, the chip architecture (RISC, C I S C  o r  I A 3 2 ) ,  
motherboard type (e.g. Symmetric Parallel Processing - SMP, Massively Parallel Processing - 
MPP), the types of operating system used (Windows, UNIX, Netware, OS390/OS400, VMS6 
and others – including Linux), and vendor dummies. 
 
For calculating server hedonic prices we use adjacent quarter regressions we then construct a 
price index by linking the quality-adjusted prices in the current quarter to the quality-adjusted 
prices in the previous quarters. This is done for each pair of quarters for each server type (work 
group/enterprise) and for each region.  The quality-adjusted price index is calculated from the 
coefficients on the time dummies, i.e.  in the standard way ) exp(
^
nmt a
42. Except for the first and 
last years we took a three-quarter moving average of the index to smooth out any large quarter-
to-quarter fluctuations
43. We also experimented with many different forms of indices
44  such as 
Laspeyres, Paasche and Fisher Ideal index.  We found that the standard method of simply using 
the exponent of un-weighted regression coefficients on the time dummy was reasonably similar 
to these more sophisticated methods (as have others – e.g. Hausman et al, 1994). Some 
experiments with these alternatives are presented in the robustness tests
45. 
 
We collected GDP, exchange rate, consumer price and PPP information from the OECD. Input 
cost indices were collected from various sources. Input prices for servers include the FRB’s 
(Federal Reserve Board) quality adjusted price index for semi-conductor chips (Aizorbe, 
2000), BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics) quality adjusted price indices for hard disk drives and 
other secondary electronic input products.   
 
Raw prices have fallen rapidly among servers (at about 15% per annum) and quality has 
improved dramatically (recall figure 2). Appendix B also gives some descriptive statistics. 
IBM, Compaq, HP, and Sun Microsystems have been the leading work group server hardware 
vendors throughout our sample period. Dell Computers entered in late 1995 and has grown 
dramatically to also be a major player by the end of the period (see Figure B1). 
 
Demand for work group servers has been growing throughout this time period and the share of 
work group servers in total expenditure has risen in all three regions. In the first quarter of 
1996 53.9% of total server expenditure in Europe was on work group systems. By 2001Q1 this 
                                                 
41 Rack mounted servers are designed to fit into nineteen inch racks.  They are growing in importance and allow 
multiple machines to be clustered or managed in a single location.  
42 It is well known that the OLS estimate of anmt is not an unbiased estimate of the antilog of the coefficient. 
Consequently when estimating the level of price from the hedonic function in log-log form we add the standard 
correction of adding 0.5*exp(υ) to the predicted price, see Goldberger (1968). 
43 The smoothing reduces transitory measurement error which will generally cause attenuation bias leading to 
estimates of the demand elasticity biased towards zero in absolute value. 
44 See inter alia Berndt and Rappaport (2001) and Berndt et al (1995). 
45 We also experimented with other variables (such as a model age variable) and functional forms (such as 
multiple interactions). The quality-adjusted prices that resulted from using these more complicated alternatives 
were similar to the results from the simpler regressions described above. 
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had risen to 58.1%. The rise in the US was from 51.6% to 57.1% and in Japan the increase was 
even more dramatic, from 35.4% to 55.7%.  
 
 
6.  Results  
6.1 “Macro” level Demand Analysis 
We first compute hedonic prices for the various markets using standard methods. Log(prices) 
are regressed on server characteristics and time dummies, allowing the effects of quality on 
price to change over time. There are 120 separate regressions (20 periods x 3 regions x 2 server 
types) estimated to construct the basic hedonic price indices. Space constraints mean that we 
cannot give all the results of all 120 regressions so Table 1 gives an illustrative example of a 
hedonic regression for US work group servers in the first two quarters of 2000
46. The time 
dummy coefficient indicates that quality adjusted prices for work group servers fell by about 
7% between the first and second quarter of 2000. Increasing main memory by 10% is 
associated with an increase of price of about 3.6%, whereas increasing clock speed by 10% is 
associated with a 1.6% increase in price. Scalability is also highly important increasing the 
number of racks by 10% is associated with price increases of about 12%
47.  
 
We use the estimates from the time dummies in these regressions to construct price indices for 
the macro regressions. The coefficients on the quality variables are allowed to change over 
time using the “adjacent quarter” approach described above. Figure 2 contains our estimate of 
hedonic prices for all servers in the US
48. It is clear that there have been substantial falls in 
quality adjusted prices over time. 
 
Table 2 reports the demand estimates pooled across regions with diagnostics in a separate table 
below (Table 2A). In Table 2 the “top level” estimates are in panel A and the (critical) middle 
level estimates are in panel B. Panel C at the foot of the table reports the conditional and 
unconditional elasticity of demand for work group servers. Looking at the top level equation 
for total server demand (panel A) the price coefficient is much larger in magnitude for the IV 
estimate (0.75) than for the OLS estimate (0.47). Since unobserved demand shocks (such as 
omitted quality) would cause a spurious positive correlation between prices and quantities, this 
bias is what we would expect. By contrast, there does not appear to be much bias associated 
                                                 
46  A detailed comparison of different estimates of server price indices is in Van Reenen (2004). The price 
regressions are potentially subject to truncation bias as the dependent variable is cut at $100,000 on its initial 
value. To check for the importance of truncation bias we first re-estimated the hedonic regressions using truncated 
regression methods of Hausman and Wise (1984). The marginal effects from the truncated regressions were 
almost identical to the marginal effects from the OLS models for both server types in all regions in all time 
periods. Since the truncation is not on the current value, but on the initial value we also experimented with a 
Heckman (1979) selectivity model. The selection equation is for the initial price (below/above $100,000) and then 
the inverse Mills ratio is included in the price regression. Again, the implied marginal effects were practically 
identical.   
47 The coefficients on the quality characteristics are significantly different for work group level servers compared 
to enterprise level servers at the 5% level. This is suggestive, although not conclusive, evidence that we are 
dealing with different markets. 
 
48 Quality-adjusted prices have fallen much faster than raw prices, for both enterprise and work group servers. 
This and this fall is particularly disguised by solely looking at the raw prices of enterprise servers. 
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with the middle level relative price coefficient
49. Column (3) uses only input costs in the IV set 
and drops the prices in other countries as instruments. Column (4) does the opposite 
experiment and drops input costs using only other prices.  The coefficients do not significantly 
change with these alternative specifications and the implied unconditional elasticities lie in a 
range of 1.11 to 1.36 
 
Table 2A presents some diagnostics showing that we cannot formally reject the Hausman test 
that OLS and IV results are the same. This raises the concern that the instruments may have 
little power
50, so the other rows report the joint significance of the excluded instruments in the 
reduced form. As can be seen the excluded instruments are highly significant in both the top 
level and the middle level. 
 
Table 3 disaggregates the results by each of the three regions. Column (1) replicates the results 
from the pooled regression for comparison and the next columns report results for the USA, 
Japan and the EU respectively. Looking at panel B, the middle level results, show that the 
relative price terms are correctly signed and significant across all regions, being largest in the 
EU and smallest in Japan. The top-level equations are poorly estimated, however, being 
insignificant in all three regions. This is due to the collinearity between GDP and the hedonic 
price trend, a common problem in the literature (see Chow, 1967).  The pooled results achieve 
identification from the differential region specific trends in prices. The middle level results 
(which are most important for the elasticity calculations) achieve identification through 
variation in relative work group vs. enterprise prices. The relative price term has much more 
within country variation than the overall price trends. Putting the estimates together shows a 
variation in unconditional elasticities between 1 and 1.3 (panel C). 
 
In terms of diagnostics, the serial correlation tests in Western Europe and the USA can detect 
no signs of autocorrelation. In Japan, on the other hand, there is a rejection of the LM test. This 
appears to be related to problems of dynamic mis-specification as the LM test fails to reject in 
Japan when we include a lagged dependent variable
51.  
 
We have subjected these macro results to a number of robustness tests that are summarized in 
Appendix A (see Table A1). We examine the impact on the elasticities of including time 
trends, experimenting with different functional forms, using alternative ways of constructing 
the quality adjusted prices, including longer dynamics and re-estimating on a larger sample 
with fewer characteristics. Although there is some variation in the precise bounds of the 
elasticity, a central estimate of 1 to 1.3 still emerges. 
                                                 
49 Possibly because we are using relative prices, so some of the OLS biases probably cancel out.  
50 The problem of “weak instruments” has been the subject of much attention in the econometric literature in 
recent years (see, for example, Staiger and Stock, 1997). A test of the joint significance of the excluded 
instruments in the reduced form equations is regarded as a good diagnostic tool in this regard. 
51 In the dynamic model the LM test gives a χ2 (1) of 0.559(p-value =0.454). Note that the long-run marginal 
effect of relative prices in the dynamic model for Japan is -0.172 compared to -0.204 in the static model. The 
unconditional elasticity of demand (see Table A1 in Appendix A) is also similar (1.08 instead of 1.05). 
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6.2 “Micro” level demand analysis 
6.2.1 Logit based approaches 
 
A summary of the main results for the nested logit estimates are contained in Table 4 (this is 
the implementation of equation (5) above). We allow the coefficients on all characteristics to 
take different values in the work group server segment than in the enterprise server segment as 
the data clearly demands this (see Table A2 in Appendix A). 
 
There is clearly a negative and significant impact of price on quantity demanded even in the 
OLS version of the simple (i.e. non-nested) logit of row (1). As expected, when we turn to the 
IV results in row (2), the price coefficient rises (by about five fold) in absolute terms from 
0.016 to 0.083. Row (3) includes the nesting variable (the within segment share). This term is 
significantly greater than zero, providing evidence for a distinct market segment for work 
group servers. The coefficient is 0.85 implying a high degree of substitution between brands 
within segment (although significantly less than unity). The presence of the segment share 
reduces the coefficient on price, although price remains a statistically significant variable. We 
regard this as our “baseline” specification
52. Note from the final column that the market level 
elasticity of demand is 0.44 – markedly less than our macro estimates. We return to this below. 
 
In response to concerns of unobserved heterogeneity we include brand random effects in row 
(4). The nesting terms remain significant and the price coefficient falls (from -0.018 to -0.011). 
In row (5) we control for brand fixed effects, but now include lags of prices and market shares 
in the instrument set. Since prices are only weakly and not strictly exogenous so we use the 
Blundell-Bond GMM system estimator discussed in the econometric section. The price 
coefficient is virtually unchanged from the baseline estimates, although the nesting parameter 
falls from 0.85 to 0.80. The standard errors on both endogenous variables rise relative to the 
previous rows. Including fixed effects and longer lags as instruments does not seem to make a 
major difference to the results. The final row of Table 4 keeps to the baseline specification but 
includes the average brand price in the EU and Japan as an additional instrument. The 
coefficient on price falls to -0.009 suggesting an implausibly low value of the price parameter; 
one which is even less elastic than OLS (-0.016). The Sargan test for this specification finds 
evidence that the instruments are invalid, however, implying some demand correlation across 
countries for the brands
53. By contrast, the validity of the instruments is not rejected in the 
other specifications. 
 
Our preliminary conclusion is that our “baseline” (row 3) specification of estimating the nested 
logit using input costs and rival characteristics as instruments does a reasonable job of 
estimating the nested logit demand relationship. 
 
Table 5 presents the structural micro demand equation and the underlying reduced forms for 
price and segment market share in more detail. The first column contains the second stage 
                                                 
52 We experimented with including other variables and other sets of instruments which lead to similar results. For 
example, including a trend was insignificant (the coefficient was -0.049 with a standard error of 0.094) as this 
seems to be captured well by our GDP control. 
53 The Sargan test did not reject the aggregate cross country instruments. This may be because common demand 
shocks to servers as a whole are not so strong, but brand specific demand shocks are strong because of co-
ordinated global marketing drives by vendors. 
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demand equation and the other columns present the first-stage reduced forms. The specification 
is the same as row 3 in table 4. Notice that across all three equations own memory and own 
clock speed is statistically significant and important control variables (they are associated with 
higher model price and market share, other things equal). The reduced forms show that rival 
memory reduces own prices and own market share as we would expect. The number of 
products in the segment is associated with lower share and lower prices. By contrast a larger 
number of a vendors’ own products in the work group segment increases price (presumably 
through a multi-product pricing effect) but lowers own share (possibly through a 
cannibalisation effect). Higher input costs also have a significantly positive impact on own 
prices
54. So, overall our instruments are not only valid, but have power in the reduced forms  
 
The model level elasticities have an unweighted mean of 5.9 (see Table A3 for their 
distribution across vendors). But the market level elasticities are of most interest and these are 
given in the final column of Table 4. The estimates on our preferred nested logit IV results 
range between 0.25 and 0.44
55. These are lower than the “macro” elasticities and suggest 
substantial upwards bias from estimates that rely on aggregated data. Using OLS (row 1) or the 
invalid “other country” instruments of row 6 leads to even lower estimated elasticities (the 
highest elasticity in the table is the simple IV logit: 0.72). 
 
We conducted many other experiments to see if the econometric method was underestimating 
the elasticity: none of these changed the qualitative results
56.  
 
6.2.2 Distance Metric Approach 
 
As an alternative micro based model we experimented with the “distance metric” approach 
described in sub-section 3.2. These are reported in Table 6. Column (1) includes the standard 
variables and own brand price (which is negative and significant). Column (2) includes the 
prices of other brands weighted by the “distance metric” using memory as the key variable (the 
further away is the other brand in “memory space”, the lower is the weight given to the price of 
the rival brand). This is positive and significant, as expected, implying important substitution 
effects among brands of work group servers. The instruments are significant in the reduced 
forms for own price and distance weighted rival price at the 1% level
57. The third column 
includes the simple average price in the segment, which is also positive but individually 
insignificant (the two rival price variables being jointly significant at the 5% level). Finally 
column (4) includes the price in the enterprise server segment. This is entirely insignificant, 
indicating the low substitutability between the two types of server and supporting the evidence 
of a separate market between work group and enterprise servers. 
 
                                                 
54  The enterprise server equation was not so well behaved (see Table A2). There is a significant impact of price in 
the OLS but this becomes insignificant when instrumented in row 2 (although still larger in magnitude and 
correctly signed). When the nesting term is included is the third and fourth rows it is significant and very similar 
in magnitude to that of the work group server equation.  The price term remains insignificant, however. The 
poorer performance of the enterprise equations seems due to the greater difficulty of finding adequate brand level 
instruments. 
55 Note that using a lower potential market factor of τ = 2 leads to even lower estimates of the elasticity of demand 
(e.g. 0.412 in row 3, 0.232 in row 4 and 0.336 in row 5). 
56 For example: (1) choosing alternative instrument sets based on other characteristics, (2) including an extra nest 
based on the operating system type, (3) allowing coefficients to vary over time. 
57 In the reduced form for price the F(7,2407)=8.16 and in the reduced form for (distance weighted) rival price the 
F(7,2407) = 15.72. 
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The implied market level elasticities of demand are in the final row. As can be seen, they are 
similar across the different specifications, in the region of 0.55 in absolute magnitude. These 
are close to those emerging from the nested logit, even through they are based on a very 
different estimation technique. These estimates are about half the size of the “macro” approach. 
 
6.2.3 Summary 
   
Table 7 summarises the market level elasticity of demand for work group servers from the 
alternative estimation techniques with bootstrapped standard errors
58. The micro based 
estimates of the market level elasticity of demand for work group servers are consistently more 
inelastic than those based on macro-estimates. There is evidence of upwards bias to the macro-
based estimates, something that might be expected given the way in which the macro-estimates 
are constructed using quality adjusted prices and quantities. Exploiting the cross sectional 
variation enables not only estimation of model elasticities (necessary for merger analysis) but 
also better estimates of market level elasticities. 
 
Table 7: Summary of Elasticities (with bootstrapped standard errors) 
 
 Macro 












Although our macro estimates are very similar to those estimated elsewhere in the literature 
using macro data, our estimates of the market level elasticity of demand for work group servers 
is lower in absolute magnitude than those estimated (from micro-methods) for PCs. Foncel and 
Ivaldi (2001) focus on home PCs and estimate that the aggregate elasticity of demand is of the 
order of 2. Genakos (2004) and Goeree (2004) also use IDC PC data and find higher market 
level own price elasticities than we do (for example, Genakos finds market level elasticities of 
about 2.5 to 4.5 using the method of Berry et al, 1995)). This difference is unsurprising. A 
large proportion of PCs are bought by households, whereas servers are bought almost 
exclusively by firms. Households are likely to be more price sensitive than the corporations 
who purchase servers. Indeed, Genakos et al (2004) find market level PC elasticities are about 




                                                 
58 These are summaries from earlier tables. Bootstrapped standard errors from 50 replications. 
59 Similarly, our brand level elasticities presented in Table A3 are lower than those in the PC literature, probably 
for similar reasons. Foncel and Ivaldi’s (2001) brand level elasticities for the home market are very high – around 
50 is typical. Hendel (1999) adopts a dynamic discrete choice approach using micro data for PCs in the banking 
and insurance industry. He reports own elasticities between 9 and 38. Stavins (1997) reports estimates of brand-
level PC elasticities between 3 and 7. 
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7. Implications of the demand estimates for market definition 
We now turn to the question of market boundaries. In particular, would elasticities of the size 
we have been estimating make a small but significant non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP) 
profitable for a hypothetical monopolist of work group servers
60? There are two parts to this 
question. First, is the SSNIP test passed for the work group server system (i.e. the 
hardware/software bundle) market and second, is the SSNIP passed for the market for the OS 
of work group servers?  
 
The answer to both questions is “yes”, even on the highest of our estimates. If the elasticity 
were less than unity then a hypothetical price rise would definitely be profitable because even 
if costs were zero, revenues would increase following a price rise. So inelastic demand always 
passes a SSNIP test. Consequently, all the micro-based estimates imply a separate market for 
work group server systems since they are below unity. 
 
Even if the elasticities were above unity (as some of the macro estimates suggest), a price rise 
may still be profitable. When price rises demand and production fall and, because there are 
lower total costs of production, profits may still rise even if revenue falls. Whether profits will 
rise depends on the ratio of price to variable costs (i.e. the gross margin). For demand curves 
that are locally of the constant elasticity form, a price rise will be profitable if the gross margin 
is less than the inverse of the elasticity of demand. To be precise the “critical elasticity” must 
be less than 1/µ for the market to constitute an anti-trust market, where µ = the price cost 
margin (price minus variable cost divided by price)
.  
 
Given our estimates of the elasticity of demand we can calculate how large gross margins 
would have to be in selling server systems to make it unprofitable for a hypothetical 
monopolist to increase price further. Using our “macro” baseline estimates of 1.2, margins 
would have to be greater than 83% (1/1.2). Even the highest estimate of 1.5 implies that 
margins would have to be over 66% (1/1.5) to make it unprofitable to increase price. Analysis 
of the accounts of major server vendors such as Dell, Compaq, IBM and Sun puts gross 
margins in the range of 25%-54%
61.  Even the highest level of price-cost margins would still 
fall well below the necessary level to defeat a hypothetical price rise.  
 
What of the second question of whether there is a market for the operating systems of work 
group servers? Recall from equation (8) that in the absence of substitution between an OS and 
other components, the derived demand is the product of the work group server demand and the 
share of the OS in total server costs (i.e. the relative price of OS to total server system price).  




Even using the upper bound of 15% the baseline micro estimates of the system elasticity (0.25 
to 0.55) imply an operating system derived demand of 0.04 to 0.08.  The macro estimates of 
the system elasticity (1 to 1.3) imply an operating system derived demand of 0.15 to 0.2. These 
                                                 
60 This is the test for market definition used by anti-trust authorities in the US and EU. 
61 This emerges from two lines of analysis. First, one can examine the information in the company accounts and 
estimate a gross margin. Second one can use engineering estimates of the costs involved in assembling a server. 
The range reflects both these methods across different vendors.  
62 Personal communication with IDC 26
th March 2001. See Appendix B for other calculations which corroborate 
this figure. 
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are very inelastic demand elasticities that clearly imply a distinct market for the operating 
systems of work group servers. 
 
The main caveat to this conclusion would be if it were easy for firms to substitute enterprise 
level OS in work group level OS. There are likely to be barriers to doing this, at least between 
Microsoft's Windows OS (which are pre-dominant in the work group level – see Figure 1) and 
enterprise level OS that are predominantly UNIX-based. This is because of the interoperability 
limitations between the two types of software that appear to have become progressively worse 
over time, particularly with Windows 2000. The European Commission (2004), for example, 
has argued that Microsoft does not disclose critical extensions to its interfaces and protocols in 
its file systems (CIFs), its security system (Kerberos), and its directory service (Active 
Directory). These are detailed in European Commission (2004)
63. To fully empirically 
investigate the interoperability issue is outside the scope of the current paper, but it is an 
important topic for future work (Genakos et al, 2004).  In summary, we believe that the 
evidence points towards a distinct anti-trust market for both work group server systems and the 





This paper has examined the market for work group servers. Servers are a large and growing 
part of the knowledge economy, yet have received little attention from empirical economists 
despite their importance for contemporary anti-trust policies, the US “productivity miracle” 
and the welfare effects of information technology.  
 
Our main findings are easily summarised. First, we have quantified the fall in the quality- 
adjusted prices of servers over the 1996-2001 period: these have been dramatic. Second, we 
have generated estimates of the demand elasticities of work group servers finding much larger 
magnitudes from an approach based on macro data (1.1 to 1.3) compared approaches based on 
the “micro” data (0.25 to 0.55). This is important, as many of the existing conclusions on 
welfare and anti-trust have relied on estimates based on the macro-data. Nevertheless, even if 
we use the higher macro-based estimates, there appears to be a distinct anti-trust market for 
work group servers and their operating systems.  This does not, of course, mean that firms with 
high shares of these markets are necessarily harming consumer welfare. But is does mean that 
the actions of such firms will come under greater anti-trust scrutiny than it would if work group 
servers were part of a wider market for all servers or for all forms of computing.  
 
There are many directions in which this research needs to be extended. The next logical step 
would be to focus in more detail in retrieving model-level elasticities by more sophisticated 
logit-based methods than the nested logit that have been the focus of the current work. A 
second extension would be to investigate in more detail the welfare implications of the price 
reductions and new good introduction in the server market. Third, empirical tests of innovation 
and the economic incentives to degrade interoperability need to be developed. Genakos et al 
(2004) have developed theoretical models that are being combined with the data from the 
server and PC market. Finally, we need to consider more carefully the investment side of the 
dynamic issues in greater detail (e.g. Ito, 1997) especially the role of entry and exit. All these 
areas are being pursued. 
                                                 
63 There are many good sources in the trade press. For example: “Microsoft Keberos Shuck and Jive” by Dominic 
Hill in The Industry Standard (May 11, 2000) or Charles Babcock “Keberos Made to Heel to Windows 2000” in 
Inter@active Week (Feb 28, 2000). 
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Table 1: 
Example of Hedonic Regression Work Group servers, USA, 2000Q1-Q2 
 
Dependent variable: log(quarterly model price) 
 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  error 
 2000Q2 dummy  -0.069 0.036 
Log(Main memory in MB)  0.359  0.024 
Log(Clock speed in MHZ)  0.159  0.028 
Log(internal storage in GB) 0.072  0.021 
Server is rack-optimised   0.972  0.065 
Log(Number of racks)  1.183  0.066 
RISC Chip  1.101  0.103 
Symmetric multiprocessing  0.470  0.074 
Operating systems 
Windows   .158  0.057 
Netware -0.001  0.053 
UNIX   0.177  0.058 
Linux -0.162  0.055 
OS390/OS400 -0.180  0.148 
VMS 0.554  0.196 
Selected Vendors    
Compaq 0.277  0.089 
Dell 0.179  0.083 
Fujitsu/Siemens 0.398  0.133 
IBM 0.206  0.086 
HP 0.366  0.075 
Sun -0.352  0.178 
    
No. observations  1067 
Adjusted R-squared  .58   
 
NOTES: This is an example of one of the 120 quarterly hedonic price regressions. The base for 
Operating Systems and vendors is “other” 
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Table 2: 
Demand Estimates for the Work group Server Market - macro 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
IV set  None  Input costs and 
other prices 
Only Input costs  Only “other 
prices” 












Panel B Middle level:  
Dependent variables is log(real share of work group servers in total server expenditure) 
Log (hedonic 




































No.  obs  63 63 63 63 
 
 
NOTES: These are the coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses below 
coefficients) of the demand system. The sample period runs from Q1 1996 to Q1 2001 and 
regions are US, Japan and EU (country dummies included in all specifications)  
PANEL A contains the results for the “top level” relating total server real quantities to the 
total server hedonic price index. Other variables are GDP and country dummies. PANEL B 
contains the “middle level” results relating the share of real expenditure of work group 
servers in total server expenditure to the (log) relative hedonic price of work group servers vs. 
enterprise servers. Country dummies included. Estimation is by OLS in column (1) and by Two 
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) in columns (2)-(4). Price is treated as endogenous in both panels. 
In panel B server expenditure is treated as endogenous. Instruments are:  server hedonic 
prices in other countries and input prices (the FRB hedonic price index for semi-conductor 
chips (Aizorbe, 2000), the BLS hedonic price indices for hard disk drives (PCU35721) and 
other secondary electronic input products (PC3571SS)).  We also use the US-Japan exchange 
rate and the US-European exchange rate as additional instruments in the Panel A and GDP as 
an additional instrument in panel B. Standard errors on the elasticities are calculated using 
the bootstrap method with 50 replications. 




Table 2A: Diagnostics for Table 2 
 
    top level  middle level 






2  Joint test of all IVs 
excluded from second 







3  Joint test of selected 
IVs excluded from 
second stage; F-test 






4  Joint test of selected 
IVs excluded from 
second stage; F-test 
(df), p-value: prices in 










6 Autocorrelation  0.154 0.314 
7 Sargan  0.120 0.350 
 
NOTES: These tests are on the model pooled across countries from Table 2 column (2). 
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Table 3: Demand Estimates for the Work group Server Market -  Breaking down 
estimates by regions 
 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
Regions All  USA  Japan  EU 
Panel A Top Level:  




















Panel B Middle level:  
Dependent variables is log(real share of work group servers in total server expenditure) 
Log (hedonic 























Panel C: Implied Elasticity of work group server market 
Unconditional 










NOTES: These are the coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses below 
coefficients) of the demand system. The time period runs from Q1 1996 to Q1 2001 and regions 
are US, Japan and EU (country dummies included in all specifications of column (1)). PANEL 
A contains the results for the “top level” relating total server real quantities to the total server 
hedonic price index. PANEL B contains the “middle level” results relating the share of real 
expenditure of work group servers in total server expenditure to the (log) relative hedonic 
price of work group servers vs. enterprise servers  
 
Estimation is by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) in all columns (same as Table 2 column (2)). 
Price is treated as endogenous in both panels. In panel B server expenditure is treated as 
endogenous. Instruments are the FRB hedonic price index for semi-conductor chips (Aizorbe, 
2000), BLS hedonic price indices for hard disk drives and other secondary electronic input 
products.  We also use the US-Japan exchange rate and the US-European exchange rate as 
additional instruments in the Panel A and GDP as an additional instrument in panel B. 
Standard errors on these elasticities are calculated using the bootstrap method with 50 
replications.  
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Table 4:  
Logit based estimation of demand for work group servers at the model level, USA 
 
































-  0.159 0.718   

































and lags of 
own prices 



















-  0.011 0.08 
 
NOTES: Dependent variable is the log of a work group server’s market share (i.e. units sold of 
a model shipped divided by total server shipments). These are the coefficients and robust 
standard errors (in parentheses) from various logit based regressions. The other included 
variables are log(maximum main memory), log(clock speed), quarter dummies, log(GDP), 
operating system proportions (Windows, Netware, UNIX, OS390/400, VMS, Linux), rack-
optimisation, log(number of racks), chip type (RISC, CISC or IA32). The two basic instruments 
sets are input prices and “other characteristics”. Input prices include FRB hedonic price index 
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for semi-conductor chips (Aizorbe, 2000), BLS hedonic price indices for hard disk drives and 
other secondary electronic input products. “Other characteristics” include: total number of 
products, number of vendors’ own products in the work group segment, count of rival memory. 
Sample is the “Big Six” vendors (Compaq, Dell, HP, IBM, NEC and Sun). There are 1593 
observations (we aggregate over operating systems). Row (5) is estimated using the Blundell 
and Bond (2000) GMM-SYS estimator in DPD. Instruments include lags of market shares and 
prices. These are lagged levels dated t-2 to t-4 in the first difference equations and the first 
difference at t-1 in the levels equations. Row (6) includes “other countries’ prices” – the 
average of the model’s price in Japan and Europe. The final column gives the absolute 
magnitude of the market level unconditional elasticity of demand for work group servers using 
a potential market factor of τ = 10. 
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(1) Share of 
model in total 
servers 
(2) Share of 





















































OS  dummies(6)  Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter 
dummies (3) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Firm dummies 
(6) 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
NOTES: These are the coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) from IV 
regressions (in column (1) from Table 4 row 3) and OLS in columns (2) and (3). The other 
included variables are operating system proportions (Windows, Netware, UNIX, OS390/400, 
VMS, Linux), chip types (RISC, CISC or IA32), whether the server is rack optimised, the 
number of racks, three input cost variables ( FRB hedonic price index for  semi-conductor 
chips, BLS hedonic price indices for hard disk drives and BLS hedonic price index for other 
secondary electronic input products),  a full set of firm dummies (Compaq/Digital/ Tandem), 
Dell, HP, IBM (Sequent), NEC, Sun Microsystems), ln(GDP) and quarter dummies.   
 
acoefficient multiplied by 10
10 
bcoefficient multiplied by 10
8 
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Table 6: Distance Metric Specification of demand for work group servers 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 






















Average price in 
work group 
server segment 




Average price in 
enterprise server 
segment 
    0.803 
(1.047) 
Absolute market 
level elasticity of 
demand for work 
group servers 





a Coefficient and standard error divided by 100 
 
NOTES: Dependent variable is the level of a work group server’s quantity shipped. These are 
the coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) from various regressions. Distance 
metric uses the difference in the absolute value of the model’s memory from other brands in the 














, | | 1
. All variables are normalized by their own 
mean value. Own price and rival prices always treated as endogenous. The other included 
variables are log(memory), log(clock speed), quarter dummies, log(GDP), operating system 
proportions (Windows, Netware, UNIX, OS390/400, VMS, Linux), rack-optimization, 
log(number of racks), chip type (RISC, CISC or IA32). The instruments sets are input prices 
“other characteristics” and the distance metric itself (results are robust to exclusion of 
distance metric from IV set). Input prices include FRB hedonic price index for semi-conductor 
chips (Aizorbe, 2000), BLS hedonic price indices for hard disk drives and other secondary 
electronic input products.  “Other characteristics” include: total number of products, number 
of vendors’ own products in the work group segment, count of rival memory. Sample is the 
“Big Six” vendors (Compaq, Dell, HP, IBM, NEC and Sun).  
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NOTES:  Worldwide unit market shares. Work group servers defined as systems that 
entered at a price point of under $100,000 
 
SOURCE: IDC Quarterly Server Tracker
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Figure 2: Empirical falls in quality adjusted price and increases in quantity of work 



































work group real units 




























NOTES: This figure illustrates the fall in quality-adjusted prices compared to increases in 
the quality adjusted shipments of workgroup servers (expressed in 1996Q1 $millions). The 
slope of the line is obviously not an accurate estimate of the elasticity of demand because 
there is no control for demand shocks (e.g. GDP growth).   
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Figure 3: Multi-level Model 
 




















   
  
Appendices to “Is there a market for work group servers”  
by John Van Reenen 
 
Appendix A: Some Additional Robustness Tests 
We report here some additional findings and robustness tests.  
 
We subjected the “macro” estimates in Tables 2 and 3 to a large number of additional tests. 
Since the main issue of interest is the size of the demand elasticity we detail how the size of 
this elasticity changes in different experiments. In Table A1, row (1) simply reproduces the 
unconditional elasticity of demand from the main results to compare with the experiments. 
Some of the identification for our results arises from the secular downward trend in the hedonic 
price of servers so row (2) simply adds a trend variable to the regressions “switching off” this 
useful source of variation. There is a fall in the size of the elasticity in the US and pooled 
results but overall the elasticities are similar to the baseline in row (1). Row (3) uses the log-
log formulation in the middle level instead of the Linearized AIDS functional form (equation 
(3) in sub-section 3.1). Some researchers prefer this functional form (e.g. Hausman et al, 1994). 
Row (4) uses an alternative approach to quality-adjust prices. We follow the so-called 
“matched model” approach that involves examining the evolution of prices for identical models 
over time (see Triplett, 1989). Since model characteristics do not change much over time this 
should control for quality more rigorously than the hedonic regression method. Hedonic 
regressions have the problem that we may not have fully controlled for all the relevant quality 
characteristics. One problem with the matched model method is that it ignores the first year in 
which a model was born (there is no pre-entry data to match with a new model) and so will 
suffer from a “new goods” bias
1. It also suffers from a bias because the models who exit would 
have had the largest falls in prices as they were made obsolete
2. We can see in row (4) that this 
alternative price index leads to lower elasticity in Japan but quite similar results elsewhere.  
 
In order to preserve degrees of freedom our basic model is static. In row (5) we allow a more 
general dynamic form of the model by including lags of all the variables on the right hand side 
of the regressions and including a lagged dependent variable
3. We then use the coefficients to 
calculate the long-run effects. This leads to the lowest estimated elasticities in the table (0.6 in 
the USA and EU).  Finally we re-analysed the data using a restricted set of server 
characteristics that enables us estimate the hedonic price regressions on the full IDC sample 
                                                 
1 This is why in the US the BLS and other statistical agencies that historically have used matched model 
approaches are switching to use more hedonic-based approaches. We partially deal with the new goods problem 
by following Triplett (1989) and using a so-called “composite” index. This uses hedonic prices in the first quarter 
a model appears and then uses the matched model approach for the rest of the model’s life. We use a chain-
weighted Laspeyres form of the price index, weighting by revenue shares in the previous period, but updating the 
shares in every period. 
2 This is emphasised by Pakes (2003) and found empirically in the server market by Van Reenen (2004).  
3 So in the middle level regressions the additional right hand side variables are: lagged work group shares, lagged 
relative prices and lagged real total server expenditure. In the top level regressions the additional variables on the 
right hand side are: lagged total server price index, lagged GDP, lagged GDP deflator and lagged total server 
quantity sold. The long run effects are the sum of the coefficients on the current and first lag of the price terms 
divided by unity minus the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. 
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(recall that 20% of sales could not be matched to memory and speed information). Again, this 
makes little difference to the results. 
 
Looking over the large number of experiments in Table A1 as a whole, the estimates of the 
unconditional demand elasticity varies between 0.6 and 1.5. Our baseline estimate of an 
elasticity of 1.2 is in the middle of this range. 
 
Table A2 presents nested logit results for enterprise servers. There is a significant impact of 
price in the OLS but this becomes insignificant when instrumented in row 2 (although still 
larger in magnitude and correctly signed). When the nesting term is included is the third row it 
is significant and slightly larger in magnitude than that of the work group server equation.  The 
price term remains insignificant, however. The poorer performance of the enterprise equations 
seems due to the greater difficulty of finding adequate brand level instruments
4. It may also 
reflect some further quality characteristics at the high end of the server market that that we 
have not adequately controlled for.  
 
Table A3 also reports some distributions of model level own price elasticities from the nested 
logit results of Table 4. The weighted mean is 3 and the unweighted mean is 5.9 (this is 
because the more numerous lower priced servers have lower elasticities – see equation (A18) in 
Appendix C).  Looking across the different vendors, models sold by NEC seem to have the 
lowest elasticities and models sold by IBM the highest. 
                                                 
4 “Other characteristics” are jointly significant in the reduced form for the nesting share (p-value of 0.028) but 
insignificant in the reduced form for price (p-value 0.347). 




Table A1: Robustness of the results to alternative ways of estimating the unconditional 
elasticity of demand for work group servers 
 
 Experiment  All  USA  Japan  Europe 
1  Basic Results (from 









2  Adding a time trend to 
the middle and top 
equations 
1.0 0.98  1.1 1.38 
3  Log-log in middle level 
instead of L-AIDS 
(3SLS with Slutsky 
Symmetry imposed but 
not homogeneity) 
1.32 1.05 1.14 1.36 
4  Using a “matched 
model” price index 
instead of a hedonic 
price index 
1.1 1.5 0.8 1.1 
5 Allowing  a  more 
general dynamic form in 
middle and top level 
(i.e. include the first lag 
of all variables, 
including the lagged 
dependent variable, on 
the right hand side of 
the equation). Long-run 
elasticities reported 
1.1 0.6 1.08  0.6 
6 restricted  server 
characteristics on larger 
sample 
1.2 1.3 0.98  0.94 
 
NOTES: These are the unconditional price elasticity of demands for work group servers. They 
are derived from estimation of the system of equations is precisely the same way as reported in 
the main results in Tables 2 and 3. 




Table A2: Logit based estimation of demand for enterprise servers at the model level, 
USA- Summary 
 
Dependent variable: log of share of enterprise servers in total server units shipped.  










2 Simple  logit 
(include  firm 
dummies) 





3 Nested  logit 
(include firm 
dummies) 







NOTES: Dependent variable is the log of a work group server’s market share (i.e. units sold of 
a model shipped divided by total server shipments). These are the coefficients and robust 
standard errors (in parentheses) from various regressions. The other included variables are 
log(maximum main memory), log(clock speed), quarter dummies, log(GDP), operating system 
proportions (Windows, Netware, UNIX, OS390/400, VMS, Linux), rack-optimisation, 
log(number of racks), chip type (RISC, CISC or IA32). The two basic instruments sets are input 
prices and other characteristics. Input prices include FRB hedonic price index for semi-
conductor chips (Aizorbe, 2000), BLS hedonic price indices for hard disk drives and other 
secondary electronic input products. “Other characteristics” include: total number of 
products, number of vendors’ own products in the work group segment, count of rival memory.  
Sample is the “Big Six” vendors (Compaq, Dell, HP, IBM, NEC and Sun). There are 709 
observations (we aggregate over operating systems).  
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Table A3: Brand level elasticities, USA 
 
 








Compaq   4.7  4.5 
Dell   3.3  2.9 
HP   6.5  4.8 
IBM   7.6  6.5 
NEC 2.6  1.5 








NOTES: These are derived from the specification of Table 4 row (3)  using a τ=10. These are 
the empirical means and standard deviations across all models.  
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Appendix B: Data 
Data Construction 
 
International Data Corporation (IDC) produces a “Quarterly Tracker” Database that is derived 
from directly questioning vendors on their pricing and total revenues of models in all the main 
regions. Units sold are estimated from the transaction price and revenue data by model. These 
are then used to calculate global totals and these are cross-checked with head offices for 
inconsistencies. There are also some customer surveys that are used as a further reality check 
on prices (see IDC, 1998, for more information on methodology).  
 
IDC gives figures for both sales of new model ("initial server shipments", ISS) and major 
upgrades. An upgrade occurs when the old server is extensively reconfigured (e.g. new 
processors added) and the name/number of the model is therefore changed by the vendor. 95% 
of all units in the IDC data are ISS rather than upgrades. Dropping the upgrades and re-
estimating solely on ISS data gives similar results to those reported here. Models that were 
priced above $5m were dropped from the analysis as we considered these 31 machines to be 
more like mainframes than servers (0.7% of the sample). 
 
The IDC data come in current dollars. We first convert all IDC prices into nominal currencies 
using average OECD exchange rates prevailing over the relevant quarter. Nominal currencies 
are appropriate for the demand system. Nominal GDP and the GDP deflators were taken from 
the OECD. 
 
As discussed in the text we matched in additional server characteristics from major server 
vendors: Compaq/Digital/Tandem, Dell, Fujitsu, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, ICL, Siemens and 
Sun. We used a wide variety of sources to obtain these data including company web-pages (e.g. 
http://www.compaq.com/products/quickspecs/QuickSpecs_Archives/QuickSpecs_Archives.HTML), back 
issues of computer magazines and their web pages (e.g. www.pcworld.com) and major 
resellers (e.g. www.digitalbasics.com). These sources specify the technical characteristics of 
the different models. We also received help by contacting some of these organisations directly. 
We collected a wide variety of characteristics, the most informative of which were memory, 
internal storage and clock/processor speed
5. The final dataset covered over 80% of the 
revenues of all servers.  
 
Our primary method of matching was through the model name, but we could also use 
characteristics common to IDC and the model specification to check the accuracy of the match 
(e.g. maximum number of processors). Models are sometimes aggregated by IDC across 
several versions.  IDC weights the final characteristics according to importance (i.e. by 
revenue). Since we did not have revenues by version we considered the minimum version, the 
median version and the maximum version. The results are given for the characteristics of the 
median version, but using the minimum or maximum made little difference to the results
6. To 
                                                 
5   Other characteristics included cache size on chip, cache size on board, list price, disk capacity in cabinet, 
maximum external storage, maximum I/O channels per processor, maximum I/O bandwidth. These had less 
explanatory power in the hedonic regressions than the three variables we focused on.  
6 We did our best to identify changes in the server characteristics over time.  For example, we used press articles 
to identify launch dates of new versions (i.e. updates in processor speed and memory) or product withdrawal 
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illustrate the methodology used in creating the database considers the following example.  The 
Digital server model named “AS8200” exists on the market in four different versions: 5/300, 
5/350, 5/440, and 5/625. “625” refers to the clock speed. The characteristics that differ between 
the versions of the model “AS8200” are shown in the following table. 
 
















AS8200  Digital  5/300 300 6000 160  39000  1996 
AS8200  Digital  5/350 350 6000 160  39000  1996 
AS8200  Digital  5/440 437 6000 160  39000  1996 
AS8200  Digital  5/300 300 12000 364 85000  1997 
AS8200  Digital  5/440 437 12000 364 85000  1997 
AS8200  Digital  5/440 437 12000 364 85000  1998 
AS8200  Digital  5/625 612 12000 720 85000  1998 
 
In order to make it compatible with the IDC data, this information would appear in the final database in 
the manner presented below: 
 




























AS8200  Digital  1996  160  160 160  3900 3900  3900 
AS8200  Digital  1997  364 364 364  8500  8500 8500 
AS8200  Digital  1998  364 720 542  8500 8500  8500 
 
We focus on the last column in the results, but tested alternative definitions from other 
columns. 
 
We follow IDC in defining the market in terms of the price point in US dollars. So models do 
not switch markets if they switch between the $100,000 price threshold we choose use the 
initial model price at which the entered the market. We also considered several other 
definitions including defining servers based on current price; using alternative thresholds 
($10,000, $25,000, $50,0000) and defining the market based on number of processors. We also 
looked at the issue of endogenous truncation (see text). Empirically, this does not make much 
difference in terms of the results. 
                                                                                                                                                            
dates.  However, this was by no means possible for all models and for many models the only server characteristics 
we could find were current ones (or in the case of withdrawn product, the latest). In those cases, in which we were 
not able to obtain information on the dynamics of the server characteristics over time, we assumed that the data 
available were representative for the particular server model across the whole period under study.  





A large number of descriptive statistics are given below. Table B1 shows the number of 
models by quarter used in the hedonic regressions. As noted in the main text there are a similar 
number of models on sale in the US and the Europe (about 700 by the end of the period) but a 
smaller number on sale in Japan  (about 450). This is a combination of the fact that Japan in a 
smaller market and, as it well known, import penetration is often more difficult in the Japanese 
market than in Europe or North America
7. 
 
Figure B1 shows the evolution of market share of the five largest work group server vendors. 
Compaq overtook IBM as market leader in the middle of our sample period. HP and Sun are 
also major players throughout the period. The most dramatic change is the rapid rise of Dell 
who entered near the start of our sample period and have grown rapidly to be major contenders 
in the industry (note that Dell have not made much inroad into the enterprise server end of the 
market). 
 
Means of all variables across all quarters are in Table B2 (these are weighted by total units sold 
in each region). Microsoft is dominant among server OS vendors, particularly in Japan. The US 
tends to have tends to have higher quality servers, on average, as measured by characteristics 
(memory, storage, number of CPUs). Work group servers have a lower total share of 
expenditure in Japan than in the US and Europe. The average price of a server is lowest in the 
US ($16,000), a bit higher in the EU ($17,000) and significantly higher in Japan ($28,000). 
 
Table B3 reports changes over time in the key variables across regions. There have been 
spectacular gains in the performance and quality of servers over this time period. Maximum 
memory has increased by a factor of 7.5 in Europe the period 1996-2000, for example. Table 
B4 displays some hedonic price correlation matrices. These show that both the level of server 
prices is highly correlated across countries.  
 
Operating System cost as a proportion of total server cost 
An important piece of information is that the OS is about 10-15% of the cost of the hardware-
software system on average. IDC communicated this, but we checked this number in several 
ways. 
In the Quarterly Tracker data the cost of the OS and Client Access Licenses (CALs) are 
included in the overall system price. For non-integrated vendors such as Microsoft, it is 
possible to get a separate estimate of the cost of the OS from the bundled system. IDC estimate 
that the “street price” for Windows OS including five basic CALS is about $700 per Microsoft 
server in the Quarterly Tracker. An average system would have more clients hooked up. IDC 
estimate that for such an average system this would cost about $750 per Microsoft server 
(Personal communication from IDC, 30th July 2001). One can also estimate a figure from the 
"Server Operating Environments (SOE) and Software Platforms" report (August 1999). In 
Table 1 Server operating environment revenues for Windows NT Platform (in 1998) were 
$1,390 million. On Table 4 total software license shipments for Windows NT were 1,814 
million. Dividing revenue by units gives an average "street price" for a Windows OS (including 
                                                 
7 See “The Land that time forgot” The Economist 30 June 2001, p.76 
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CALS) of about $766. The difference between the two figures is trivial. These are, of course, 
below the full list price of Microsoft Windows because of the various discounts offered. 
The average price of an under $100,000 system sold in the US in 2000 was $8350. This implies 
that the proportionate cost of the operating system (including CALs) was 9%(=$750/$8350).   






Number of Observations by Time Period and Region 
 
Time USA JAPAN 
Western 
Europe 
 1996q1  602   299     529   
 1996q2  582   306     508   
 1996q3  597   350     530   
 1996q4  623   363     616   
 1997q1  596   390     629   
 1997q2  619   423     654   
 1997q3  644   413     666   
 1997q4  699   418     700   
 1998q1  745   388     655   
 1998q2  724   384     700   
 1998q3  692   329     754   
 1998q4  708   321     741   
 1999q1  736   362     739   
 1999q2  696   432     749   
 1999q3  664   363     668   
 1999q4  706   390     669   
 2000q1  755   389     637   
 2000q2  821   393     702   
 2000q3  771   410     648   
 2000q4  726   450     704   
2001q1  653   447     703   
Total  14359 8020  13901 
 
NOTE: An observation corresponds to a model in a particular quarter in a particular country. A 
model is defined as specific to a hardware-OS combination as defined by IDC. 






Means of Variables by region (weighted by volume sold) 
 




Windows   0.41 0.65 0.42
Netware   0.26 0.06 0.25
UNIX   0.20 0.14 0.21
Linux 0.06 0.03 0.05
OS/390 and OS/400  0.02 0.01 0.03
Vms   0.01 0.001 0.01
Other OS   0.05 0.11 0.04
Characteristics 
Base memory (MB)  248 214 202
Maximum memory (MB)  5476 4663 4221
Clock speed (MhZ)  370 411 372
Internal storage (GB)  243 145 222
Xrack, Rack-optimised   0.16 0.07 0.12
IA32 ,chip, Intel 32 bit   0.82 0.76 0.83
RISC, Reduced Instruction Set Chip   0.17 0.15 0.17
CISC, Complex Instruction Set Chip    0.01 0.09 0.01
Up, Uni-Parallel Processor   0.27 0.40 0.34
Smp, Symetrically Parallel   0.73 0.60 0.66
Number of racks   2.30 1.08 2.27
CPU capacity   2.64 2.48 2.34
number of CPUs   1.66 1.49 1.36
Share of expenditure on workgroup 
servers under the threshold of: 
<$25,000 0.344 0.261 0.357
<$50,000   0.455 0.348 0.464
<$100,000 0.527 0.441 0.544
price of server in $1000s  15.72 27.71 16.66
 
 
Number of observations  14359 8020 13901
                  
 
 
NOTES: These are weighted means (weight is number of units sold in a region). All models of 
servers used across all time periods. 
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Table B3: Changes in key variables over time and across regions  
 
 
 US  JAPAN  EU 
Price  ($1000s)     
1996  26.8 42.1 21.3 
1997  21.7 39.1 19.3 
1998  16.0 33.0 17.6 
1999  13.4 20.5 13.8 
2000  12.1 17.9 15.6 
2001Q1  11.2 14.7 14.13 





US JAPAN  EU 
    
1996 1401 1089 953 
1997 2312 1974 1652 
1998 3660 3878 2857 
1999 5244 3150 4056 
2000 8760 7905 7158 




US JAPAN  EU 
    
1996 100  89  81 
1997  124 110 99 
1998  180 153 146 
1999  233 183 170 
2000  378 297 320 




US JAPAN  EU 
    
1996  196 211 170 
1997  331 343 309 
1998  448 433 372 
1999  633 517 493 
2000  971 820 702 





US JAPAN  EU 
    
1996  63 28 36 
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1997 173  91  135 
1998  292 155 212 
1999  306 152 235 
2000  332 174 280 
    
 
 
NOTES: All models weighted by volume of shipments. Prices are in nominal $1000s. In the 
base quarter (1996Q1) exchange rate differences are normalized to unity. After this period, 
changes in prices reflect changes in exchange rates, server mix and prices. The weakness of 
the Euro vs. the dollar is the reason for the rise in nominal server prices in the EU in 2000 





Hedonic Price Correlation matrices 
 
(a) Correlation matrix of workgroup server hedonic prices across countries  
 
 USA  Japan  EU 
USA 1     
Japan 0.973**  1   
EU 0.955**  0.934**  1 
 
 
(b) Correlation matrix of enterprise server hedonic prices across countries  
 
 USA  Japan  EU 
USA 1     
Japan 0.953**  1   




(c) Correlation matrix of overall server price index across countries 
 
 
 USA  Japan  EU 
USA 1     
Japan 0.959**  1   





NOTES: These are quality adjusted prices 1996Q1 to 2001Q1. A ** indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level  
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 IBM  Compaq
 Dell  HP











NOTES: These are the market shares (in worldwide revenues) of the main 5 hardware vendors 
in the work group server market (under $100,000).
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Appendix C: Details of Economic Models 
C.A. Nested Logit Model 
Demand 
 
Consider there are N separate markets where n = 1,…,N is one region (i.e. US, Japan or EU) in 
one time period. Market size is Ln. We will drop the n-index for simplicity in what follows. 
Each customer, f = 1,…., F can buy up to one good in each market
8 or select the outside good.  
This means a customer chooses one of the set M = {W, H, 0} where W indicates a work group 
server, H a higher level/enterprise server and 0 the outside good. Once this group is chosen the 
customer then chooses a model. 
 




f V U ε + =                      
Vim is the mean utility of all customers buying i, and   is the unobserved variables that 
explain customer f’s departure from the common utility level. The mean utility level can be 




im im im im p V V ξ ξ α + + − =  
 
where  im V  is the deterministic part that depends on the specific model-type of server, ξ is a 
market specific component and  im ξ  is a random term reflecting the effect of unobserved 
characteristics of models on the mean utility. pim is the price of the selected product and α is a 
parameter of interest to be estimated. 
 










im ,.... 1 , ) 1 ( = ∀ − + = ν σ ν ε  
where σ is a parameter to be estimated and indicates how closely correlated are consumers’ 
preferences within a server segment. The random components at each stage of the decision tree 
are endowed with the required distributions so that  ,  , and  satisfy the extreme 








The model allows us to decompose si, the unconditional probability of selecting a server i as 
the product of two probabilities: 
•  s(i|m), the probability of choosing server i conditional on choosing a server of type m 
and 
•  s(m) the probability of choosing a server of type m. 
 
To see this note that the probability of choosing model i conditional on choice of server type 
{W,H,0} for the logit model is: 
 
(A4) 
                                                 
8 See Hendel (1999) or Smith (2002) for an extension to the case of multi-good purchases. 

















where µ = 1/(1- σ) 
 














Vm is an inclusive value defined as  
(A6) 
 
m I i im m D V V
m ln ) exp( ln
1 1 −
∈
− = = ∑ µ µ µ  
 








The unconditional probability of selecting model i is 
 
(A8) 
si = s(i|m)s(m) 
 
or 
 ln si = lns(i|m) + lns(m) 
 







































= =  
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Taking logs and using (A7) gives 
(A12)  
0 ln ln ) 1
1
( ln s D V s m im i + − + =
µ
µ  
Equation (A12) still relies on the unknown Dm but can be calculated from combining (A9) with 
(A10) and taking logs 
(A13) 
) ln (ln ln 0 s s D i m − = µ  
 




0 ln ) | ( ln ln s m i s V s im i + + = σ  
 
Substituting in for Vim gives the market share equation: 
(A15) 
 
im im im i s m i s p V s ξ ξ σ α + + + + − = 0 ln ) | ( ln ln  
 
where s(i|m) = qim/Qm, is the market share (in units)
9 of model i in the server type defined by 
group m, and sim = qim/L.  
 
We parameterise the mean utility level as a linear function of the (predetermined) 
characteristics of servers, X, i.e.  
(A16) 
 
θ ' im im X V =  
 
Following Ivaldi and Verboven (2001), we define the potential market to be equal to the actual 
flows of servers (Q) multiplied by a scaling factor, i.e. L = Q(1+τ). 
 








a0 = lnτ + ξ 
 
This is the main equation that we estimate when implementing this methodology. If there is a 
difference between the work group server market segment and enterprise server market 
segment, then σ > 0. Theory also restricts 1 > σ and α > 0.  
                                                 
9 Note that we are using lower case s for quantity shares and upper case S (or W) for revenue/value shares. 
  18  
  
 
































m j j ijm r q p α η =  
 
The cross price elasticity of demand for model i with respect to model j (in another server 
segment) is 
L
q p j j
ijm
α
η = '  
 
More aggregate elasticities can be estimated by simulating a 1% increase in all server prices 





Consider the generic program for a multi-product firm, h, with models i in the set Z
h. We 
assume that in each market the firm plays Nash in prices (for differentiated products). For a 




























q 0 ) ( ) (  
 





























 The first term on the right hand side is the usual own price elasticity effect whereas the second 
term reflects the incentives of the multi-product firm. The closer are two substitute models 
owned by the same firm, the higher will be their joint price, other things equal. Inspection of 
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this equation immediately suggests the different possible instruments for price in the demand 
equation 
 
•  Cost shifters which exogenously move ci.  These will include the quality-adjusted price 
of inputs (such as semi-conductor chips). Prices of brands in other countries are also 
meant to proxy for model-specific costs shifts. 
•  Secondly, factors that exogenously shift the own brand elasticity of demand are 
candidate instruments. Under the assumption that brand numbers and characteristics are 
(econometrically) exogenous we can use (i) the number of other products in the market 
segment and (ii) the characteristics of other brands. A larger number of products will 
increase the own brand elasticity (in absolute value). 
•  Thirdly, the number and characteristics of the other products produced by firm h will 
also impact on pricing through the second term. 
 
Given explicit functional forms we can solve the FOC analytically. In fact the nested logit has 
a closed form solution. If there are I models there are I equations that enable a solution for each 
brand’s mark-up (π). The formula is complex (see Foncel and Ivaldi, 2001) but can be 
expressed as (for firm h) 
 
    ) , , , ; , , ( L Q Q Z f c p m h i i i σ θ α π = − =  
 
 
Given estimates of the parameters, the margins or marginal costs can be checked against any 
actual data to check the plausibility of the estimates. Alternatively, a comparison with actual 
margins can be used to test the assumption of Nash pricing versus co-ordinated pricing (see 
Nevo, 2001; Slade, 2004). Another strategy is to assume a parametric relationship between 
marginal costs and brand characteristics (cf. Bresnahan, 1987, Greenstein, 1997). For example 
 
i i i X c ω κ + = ' 
 
and form the supply side pricing equation 
 
i i m h i X L Q Q Z f p ω κ σ θ α + + = ' ) , , , ; , , ( 
 
Given the assumed functional forms this can be written (e.g. Berry, 1994) 
 
[] i i m i i i Q q Q q X p ω σ σ
α
σ







−1 ) / ln( ) 1 ( ) / ln( 1 (
1
'                              (A20) 
 
This equation illustrates the problem with the standard hedonic pricing equation that only has 
the first term on the right hand side. We also need a correction for the variation in the mark-up 
that is the second (endogenous) term. 
 
The supply equation can be stacked with the demand side in a two-equation system. This can 
be estimated by FIML or non-linear three stage least squares with the structural cross equation 
restrictions imposed. In principle this should improve efficiency of the estimate parameters. It 
does impose more structure on the precise way in which firms are interacting in the product 
market, however, and if the Nash assumption is incorrect the estimates of the demand 
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parameters will be biased. Consequently we focus only on the demand side of the estimation 
without imposing any constraints from the supply side equations. 
 
 
C.B. Multi-level model 
In the middle-level system we use the L-AIDS (Linearized Almost Ideal Demand System) of 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, 1980b).   
 
()∑ = + + Π + =
M
m nmt nmt nk nt nm nm nmt u Y S
1 0 log log π δ β β            (B1) 
 
where Y = total expenditure on servers in mth segment of the nth country, π = (quality adjusted) 
price of servers in segment m, and u is a random error term. 
 
So, for workgroup servers (suppressing the region n sub-scripts) we have: 
 
() Wt Ht WH Wt WW t W W Wt u Y S + + + Π + = π δ π δ β β log log log 0  (B2) 
 
Since we are in the two-good case, homogeneity plus Slutsky symmetry imply δWW = -δWH.  
Imposing these restrictions means that we can simplify equation (B2) to: 
 
() () Wt Ht Wt WW t W W Wt u Y S + + Π + = π π δ β β log log 0  (B3) 
 
The enterprise-level server equation analogous to equation (B3) also replaces the left-hand-side 
variable by the expenditure share of enterprise-level servers sold, and the right-hand-side 
variables remain the same.  But there is no additional information in this equation and all its 
parameters can be recovered from equation (B3).   
 
Consider the elasticities of interest. By definition, SW  = PWQW/Y where QW is the quantity of 
workgroup servers. Taking logarithms of both sides and differentiating with respect to the log 
of the price of workgroup servers implies that we can write the elasticity of demand for 










































Define the conditional elasticity of demand (i.e. holding nominal server expenditure, Y, fixed) 
as EWW. Using equations (B2) this is 
(B5) 
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The differential in (B5), ∂ log Π / logπ ∂ W , is approximated by differentiating the true price 
index: 
(B6) 
H WH W WW W
w










This will be approximately equal to the share of workgroup servers in total server expenditure.  
 
Using the fact that Y = DΠ and differentiating the last term in equation (B4) gives the 
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